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l ! ! ! I  I torship of one man at the head of a rn0;11~lithi~ and 
organization which is the sole legal political party in the 
ritories under its rule. 
Bat although we Socialists have alwaP'a been 
CO-& principle and practice of dictatorship, we were among 
the staunchest supporters of the rights of revolutionary Rueeia. 
We steadily advocated American recognition of Lenin's regim 
If I may be pardoned a' personal word, I am proud to re- 
General Burleeon told me that I wag worse than Debs and should 
get a long sentence because of an article I wrote oppoeing President 
~ileonn's use of American military forces at Archangel and Siberia. 
member that before the end of the First World War Postmaster 
In the anti-red hysteria which followed the First World War we 
opened our own house for a meeting to hear the unofficial Btlseian 
repreeentiitives, Messrs. Martens and Nuorteva, at a time when no 
hall could be found and when Government secret agents formed a 
considerable part of the audience. 
Even after the danger of direct attack on the U. So S. R. was 
ova, we recognized and opposed the anti-Staliniet intrigues of the 
western European "democracies," their aid to fascism, and their 
shameful treatment of Loyalist Spain and Czechoslovakia. Until the 
time of the famous Russian purges, a decisive majority of American 
Socialists had so- deep a desire to emphasize the hope for the world 
implicit in the Ruisian revolution that we tended to minimize rather , 
than exaggerate its faults. We honestly desired to find whether 
there was a basis for cooperation,' at least on specific issues, with 
Communists. It was only our experience with American Communists, 
plus the facts which we shall set forth in this pamphlet, which com- 
pelled us to take our present position. Again, if  I may speak for 
myself, I have regretted few things more than the necessity laid upon 
me by the truth to recognize in Stalin'e achievemente a betrayal 
rather than a fulfillment of true socialiem. To say thie is not to deny ' 
the greatneee of some of those achievemente. 
Two otherfobservations will help in understanding t h i ~  pa* 
phlet. The fimt b an answer to the rather common belief that the- 
outside world is in darkness concernin6 fundamental facts abort%;; 
the R-ian Government and way of life, or that there is great dbkf- 
pute about the facte. It is of mume true that more d better 
formation about Russia is 'highly desirable. Whatevex k y  
been the case in the early days of the Revolution, oar present lack 
of infomation is due to the difficulties which the Rnseian Govern. 
ment iteelf puts in the way of reporters and travellers far more than 
to any other cause. However, we have a larger body of information 
than is sometimes realised. The face to be set forth in this pamphlet, 
with unimportant ex~eptions, have never been d o d y  contradicted 
by Commnniet spukesgaeq 9s the influential group of indisc-ate 
eulogiste of Stalin's Russia. Becaw I have earne~tly d e e d  to be- 
lieve the beet of Russia I have looked and looked in vain for -any 
convincing refutation of them. In publie and in private, ardent de- 
fenders of the Soviet regime have denauneed in general terms aIl  
criticism of it or have minimized its importance or have insisted that 
it was incidental to any revolution. "You can't," they continually 
cry. ,"make omelettes without breaking eggs," but they have not 
dbputed oar facts about either the eggs or the omelette. ' 
Some of Stalin's apologiets aseume that certain facg in Rnreian 
wry and R u d m  conditions jastify an entirely different standard 
4 j-t thnn one wadd apply to Amexica on one hand or to 
ai,tlm98 Germany on the other. By eome Such proceeg as this, Wendell 
W W e  fovnd it p d l e  to be at one at the same time a crusader 
for fme e n t e r p h  in Ammica and P rather in&- eulogbt 
of Str l in  in Russia. Rapmond ~ o i e ~ ,  in a Town Meeting on the 
Air, oedd p~aise Stalin and denounce all criticism of Sta1i.n'~ foreign 
policy while going oat of his way to condemn all Ameri- Corn 
m d t e  to whom Stalin b more than the Pope is to a loyal Catho&, 
And &is leads me to the second observation whieh is nemmry 
a 3n ~ h b d i n g  of this ppm$let. 'It is true that one mnet make 
dm- for history gnd objective conditiom in judging nations 
and their govenunente. I t  is especially true that they shodd be 
jadged by the direction .in which they are moving rather than the 
pow whiEb they hAe reached. It is not true that there is a doable 
e W d  d m # ;  +at, for example, forced labor wae an infamous 
&very under Hitler but is a justifiable necessity or even a *e 
pnder s- It .ir tnra that societies re~ting on private capitalism 
h.v@ gave fa& m e  of which are not to be found in R~tseia, but 
a mavement like eqeialiem or Lenin's ~ o m m ~ x r i ,  which sets out 
to remQve those fadta, cannot indefinitely plead capitalist spraxmy 
as m -'for itr, own institution aid perpetuation of new t y d e s .  
Latitude and longtitude make a diference in haman affaire, but 
. . 
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3t3a tor. oar pupme the important thing k that largely-inr .' 
f i ~ . & i , d  mom lgtqdy in the warld% opiniam, the We8 Unio~i b, 
At a time when mmntment of madma h 
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of courage which ihe R u m i d  e-vdr &played ag-t the Nrui 
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vaders? Did not the R d m  themaelves when more than half of 
them were seds drive mat Napoleon who certainly would have 
aboli~hed mrfdom? Did not the Roman Empire rule a large part 
of a world which it conquered by cruelty, with very coneiderable 
*tisfaction to ib snbjectr to whom ' it gave law and order, and nlti- 
mately Roman citizenship, bat certainly not liberty or democracy 
we undemtand those tern? In this war the ease with which the 
N& m h e d  a comparatively damocratic France did not prove the 
wperiority of their ideologp'. If Great Bri- had not had the pro- 
. 
Won of her air foma and the Channel she would have been 
cmhed. So too, would ~nss ia  hemlf if she had been no larger than 
Fmce since the Wehrmacht occupied &any times a8 mach Russian 
temtory es French until defeated partly by the difficulty of sapport- 
ing sach extended  line^. 
Autocracies can eatisfy people fairly well over long gkriode 
of time if they will distribute some bread and a few circuses a d  
find m y h  to justify their rule which appeal to notions dominant in 
the popalar mind, The myth of the divine right of kings or of an 
8138toetatie class h dead in most of the world, but the myth of die  
tatom more absolnte than %ingb, who nevertheleg% claim to speak 
for the many in the name of the nation or of the working claes, is 
by no me- dead. - 
In Rnsieia Communiem #day is doing what capitalism did in 
, its different way in the nineteenth and early twentieth cemtnriee. 
It ie giving etmng, ambitious and reasonably lucky men a chance 
to* in the world. Success hae depended little on the accident of 
birth, and in the'Rnseia which remembers the Gars that ie a peat  
thing. 
Mde from that, education, at least of an elementary sort, and 
eocial services for the massea, have made great progrew under the 
Communist dictatorship. Propaghda has exaggerated that p r o m  
partly by m+hg the picture .of life in R d a  under the Czars, the 
extant of -i&teraey and the lack of health ~ e ~ c e s ,  wore than it 
was.- The widely circulated book, Soviet Power, by the Dean- of 
Canterbury, gives a glowing account of Soviet achievement in bring- 
ing education, -health, mil opportdties. for travel and vacations 
to .the m&em His report conforms more .nearly to what the Govern- 
ment hopes win be or wants the people to expect than to what 
actaally is In 1937 when I was in R d a  I heard American and other 
- 
tenr5rsi rave ow- Ibisdm day numerics, hoepitab w d  rehook; 
it.am&ing of tha exiwd in other l a n k  I am a ilhprp~critie d 
&rim wci.l- -e. d the inadequaciee of oat social & 
' ~ 3 ~  I could easily urg+ o tbar of harpitab, &bb,--m. 
f o ~  eta. in. America fu more h p s d v e  #hazt ~tp* -I : 
WM rhom in R d .  The oumprhtpn iqn't qaits fdr becaw d 
~nradu;  porn*. I gladly -rd that r eaw mu& in. R d a  te adrnim . 
I waa not favorably imp 
aehod that I mw. The director k t m l f  .polo 
Or the building which wm in bad 
ten p r a  old. Reghaemtation of a military eort even fur W e  
a m h d  to be &e order of the day. The mhool wm in 
WeFitor to a D d h  public eelhael which I Pisited mnis 
ht& On ths ether hand, I w e  "ammdg i m p m d . b y  k 
tbat I wa & o m  of ,attractively printed e d n u t i d  mate&& 
Zi~tsrb~ure in 111 the langnagea and dialecta of the'U. S. S. 3%. EI& 
*e g y p y  language wm for. the first time reduced to writing d ' 
were learning to reed, By mad largs I should expect -&ad* 
progreacl-in homing, health cervices and formal .education wlth rSi 
&!if W e .  it.' worse counterpart in Nazi Germany, will eee 
d d *  wor* md peak~ts  are well looked after. (But it -4. 
the Genaon, t h  far greater care d the elite - of which maze. 
f&apter]IELj - i  
It wPill be able to do .thh becanae the R d a n  pattern 
oo11d~m hss proved itdf able to-produce and in the 
b d h  misr ~11emplqment. At the. nm3t critical 
msnt. Ot the R d u r  phmmd edwsmy 
adidat- bodt df the apbghtufor privatd capitalimn in my y 
thet that -qmtern add - d y  that. sptem w e  able to mPLt .a 
ure of rnaehhsry and tecbI4gy  ind -&ly hereaim 
of State Capitakm - but. a b  the different N d  foim d- 
capitalism uader a dietator-prodam &ia& to prepare 
mn~h to Arne150811 help. bat it 
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&da%triabhg a backward country and later in maintaining so hi& 
a level of pduction after BO many of the country's industrial centere 
had been overrun by the enemy. 
Both Staih9~- and Hitier's 8 ~ ~ ~ 8 s ~  in banirhing mas8 me- 
plopment may be attributed in large part to the vastnem of their 
preparations for war bar especially in Russia where -there is still 
M) gigantic a task of peacetime comtmction it ii not r e a m d l e  to 
believe that the succem of phr6ng  ~ d e r  a c o ~ & t h b t  economy 
is dependent upon the acceptance of recurring wan and preparation 
for them. I shall later report facts whi& j d y  criticism of the ef- 
fect3vmesa ae well ae the democracy of ~ d &  co~ectivism under 
dictatorial control. Nevertheless certain of the techniques worked 
out in the management of Russian industry and agriculture will have 
value for other nations. Even in the Ukraine the agricdtural kolhozes 
seem to* have been so well eatabhhed that the German occupation 
preferred not to break them but to we them. As for industry9 in the 
~ k n t  temper of the world, the w o r k  will stand for considerable 
inefficiency, p a v e ,  and mnch dictatorship if they can have d t y  
against unemp1op8nt. , 
No socialist criticism of the Russian +em is inspired by any 
Irelid that it is either possible or desirable for R d a  to change 
over to a private profit system such a0 we s t i l l  have in America. 
Whatever modifications of Lenin's original concept of s o e i h  or 
com~11uni8m may have taken place in the U. S. S. R ,  there is no 
sign whatever of any retorn to private ownership of bat6c resources 
and'indnstrier, and their management for the profit of their owners. 
The qnestion'behe the ivorld is not the r-b-ent of private 
cap idhn  in the U. S. S. R.9 or for that matter anywhere in Europe. 
It is whether-a planned economy directed to the &ommon weW 
being nqailre8 -the tyrannies of the totalitarian state. We S o c i a b  
answer that question with an emphatic negative. But if any country 
ii to. .develop - democratic s ~ i i c t ~  an - 'emmtial step . innet -be an 
andemtandingof he-factors  which give the Sodet Uniod astraigth 
that: never coda bif derived merely from- its me of the apparatas . 
ufmthle~e~epdgm..  . : - -  . " . . . . . - 
. : :.. The ieader may adk -why m -myv &h0wledgm&t of R d a n  
pieatnm -I have' not crediged - Stalin'8. Communism as the n e m d  
di hacim~~ It is -lwxmmm I c a m t  aecept the p o p d a  belief that almost 
ztn.-g-cr;n be forgiven Stah's regime - h c e  it has been the* chief-, 
/ 
indeed the only coneistent foe of fasoism. Russia's military might 
and courage were enormous factors in Hitler's defeat. But Communbt 
totalitarianism cannot drive out the devils of fascist totalitarianism 
because it ha8 too many of its own. Hitler copied many of Stalin'e 
techniques; he made a temporary alliance with him, and victorious . 
Russia perpetmtes on a vast scale the same forced labor which we 
rw, bitterly condemned in Germany. The strhQgle for true freedom 
is yet to be won. 
CHAPTER 111 
IF YOU WERE A RUSSIAN 
It is a great mistake to believe that we Socialists worship some 
ism; that we care more about a, form of political and economic or- 
ganization than the well-being of men, women and children who 
live under it. What we want is plenty, peace and freedom for dl. 
With them muet go a steady march toward an equality of human ; 
rights, opportunities, and obligations. This does not mean that all 
men will'be equal in ability or that there must be equality of re- 
ward for work. It does mean the end of social castes and hierarchies 
perpetuating privilege by superiority of economic or social status. 
The condition for -obtaining these good things is that society should 
increa&ngly become a fellowship of free men, with social control 
of the natural resources and tools so that they can be used for the 
common good. In such a society every able bodied adult.would be a 
worker contributing something to the ponderable and imponderable 
wealth of the community. So great is man's productive capacity, 
thanks to modern technology, that a high standard of liviag is obtain- 
able all over the world even regions which are at present non- 
industriabed and economically backwards. 
In achieving a s o c i a  society it is necesllary to get control 
of the machinery of the state and to use the state as the & e m  
and most inclusive of public aervarite. But if in the p r o m  we deify 
the state and set up a society in which men exist for the etate and 
not the 6tate for men we shall have established a new and p~ul ia r ly  
dangerous tyranny. State officials directing both the ec~homic a d :  
political apparatus who are not snbject to democratic coritr011 can. 
be more arbitrary tyranu and worm exploitem than an owning c l w  
12 
in a capitalist democracy. Even if the totalitarian state under a dicta- 
tor &odd suc~eed in h l i sh ing  unemployment and taking tolerable 
w e  of ita slaves, it would be a cume to the finest sort of human 
development. Men are entitled to something better than government 
on the principle "milk from contented cows." 
I have said these thinep in order to indicate the standards by 
which Socialists must measare the achievements of true democratic 
d d i s m .  Of course we make allowances for the fact that no one 
revolutionary act can achieve Utopia. We never expected the full 
light of freedom to follow the darkne88 of Czarist indfieiency, cor- 
ruption and tyranny. The fair way to judge the Communist pee 
formance in Russia ie by the direction in which it is going r a t h  
than the point at which it has arrived. Perhaps the best way to pre-. 
sent the facts would be to try to tell you what life would be like for 
you if you were a Russian, in respect to some of the fundamentals 
of plenty and freedom. 
How would you live in respect to material things? That 
would depend an who yon were.'~here is a lack of complete and 
accurate m t b t i c d  information but &g what figures are available 
it hm ban calctilated that if poa were an average worker before 
World War II, living in Leningrad, your food consumption would 
by 1937 hive dropped to a level 32% below the pte-revolutionary 
standard, and 86% below that which had been reached in 1929. 
Using somewhat different metho& a study by F. Forest reaches 
practically the wune results in meamring real wages in M&w. 
Arthur Koestlar, to whose essay on S09iet Myth d Reday I a q  
indebted for these fi- goes on to cite authoritiq w i n g  Soviet 
~tatietica, to &ow that food consumption per head in Russian citia 
stood 30%'below the b a t e  for the worst fed 10% of the Britieh 
populatioa Various Americans have recorded the fact that Rllesian 
food standards were definitely below that allowed in relief in 
America, 
In respect to other consumer goods you would, if you were 
a R d a n ,  be equally badly off. In 1937 when I was in Russia such 
g d  were few and poor. A pair of what in America we would call 
cheap ah- eoet a month  average wage and a good suit five or six 
monthe' wages. Housing was very bad. One could allow for the over 
crowding following the confusion of the First World War and the 
Revohtion just as one can allow for terrible conditions that doubtlees 
prodded. +th o :wsFl 
kt it:* ' B Y O ~  imd it $waw  fa^ mdrxe! ovemrowdedt - 
.mp.m &pigbe' 4f : - E o Q F ~ & ~  bb nmkiag the k t  4, 
bauidr.Stalin-the fhaim* o f - . : ] & * ~ -  
p4l ios ( .anddymal lyLeap~~tyrmt i  . . 
It. yon were a R d m  p-t you mi&t:h.ve 
,~k.~~6f!&&&~~~ 
- p S i i . ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ' a ~ ~ ~ z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I t ! ~ ~ & ~ . w h ~ e  6. 
- & ~ ~ f i & r ~ + , l t o ' ~ r i . ~ & 4 k s B Y  &..&e..-Cb-& 
- tik4&ded td p d v q  LJ* post.wat &nditiom1 
-dr( w 4 ) b ~ * .  It t w ~  
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are not necerearily ewil if the floor under wag- .and &aria is not 
too low and the ceiling not 500 high. Nevertheleas, onrx Stalk had 
hailed the prinaiple of ineqeality and denounced e q d i t a r i b  
ar a crime .gW the 8oci*lirt state, the differences in reward in a 
poor amtq where the ]lowest wag& were very low became as grept 
or even ggeater *& in aapit.lirt Ameriqm. Bef~re the Seood World 
Wm (the mnal &te wu that the rcltio of the lowest to the higbed 
waa Qne to sixty."&~e4m qnoter fig we;^^ of a Donet. coal mine &ow 
ing that "the e r l e  d dkectorh chid qgineen and admbhtratom 
in .he  top stzatwn a m  up to P hun&ed 'w higher than the avezage 
wage an8 up to thres hundred time8 higher than the minimum 
wage.." 
In 1943, when war aonditiom were at .their worst, the Soviet 
pmw hailed the appearance of the f h t  "p'pro1etui.n miIlio&e,'' 
a a e r t h  Berdyebekov, who hoppems to be a director of a statq farm 
i a : a p e o f t h e ~ r p u t r o f t h e o ~ a ~ r .  
.- Peter Dmcker illwtratee at the disparity in e a m h p  
in an azhb is the Satwday Evenkg Port, (July 21,1945) enwed 
Stakir Pap What Theyte W m t k  He en& by prrising the good 
~dta t *tive wryer which naight be w p i .  m America .But 
he ber~pnffiomly admitted tbu bbuince the wU, the privilqd pad- 
t i o o - o f - h 8 i R d a n  industrial executive has become much mon, 
marked'? tadmpsot o day and bonawea of foad Pnd housing. Tbjr 
w h .  atbe: f o b  are worn off. .He. akuo admits that individual 
w w b m  "da .mot &are in the pmfita of induetry to any' geat extent'' 
becawe am eoan as a few workem increase their prdpctiOn the bme 
fos piece w d  ppy h raieed "in the WQ- tradition of 'cllphaliat 
~ ~ ~ t i 0 1 ~ ' 9 "  
, Thi, pthcipie of e x d v e  differenti& in pay wplr d e d  
over into tbe army where the private soldier gets ten roblee a month; 
a lie-t, one thousand; and a c a b &  twenty-four hnndd. In 
the Britinh Ammy the ratio of a private's pay to a ligntammt'a is ope 
t&ar; in the American Army, one to three; and in the Soviet Armyb 
one to onehundred. And the R d n  private gea lees not more than 
the Amexiaan & ~ n n r  of food, clotbg and entertainment. It b 
import.nt that there facts, completely at vahnce with soairlist prim 
+la &odd be. Imown bemlue recent polls have &own that a 
large number da the r i c am et iU believe that there & equality of pay 
in R* 
1 
"But," someone may a& "if I were a R d a n  wouldn't I gae 
so many fiee ~ r v i c e ~  or privileges, like concerte at low prices, that IS. 
would be oompen~ated for low wages?'' The answer is, no. We havd', 
already said that there are excellent social e e ~ c e e  in R d a  d. 
that with the p w t h  of ~neei& prosperity they will doubtless hi 
increased. Nevertheleas before and during the war, health and othm 
8eTVicee to Russian workers and soldiers were vastly inferior to thi 
American standard. The brilliance of certain medical and t3urgid 
perfommces by R d a n  physicians, and the general superiodtp 
of medical services to the people bver Csarist tima .annot alter that .. 
fact. I heard an Ameriem Red Crose worker baek from R d s  
deecribe how he and some American officials had been show 
through an admirable newly equipped hospital in or near a p a t  ' 
MOBCOW railroad station, It was empty. Only after the party h d  
completed a rather leisurely survey were they taken out to a r&a& 
platform where the wounded who could walk were lined up in*' 
military formatian to receive them. They had arrived by train some 
hoam before but had be& kept waiting the official pleasure. . 
It would mamely be worthy of comment in view of R d d  
eonditims that hospitdls and rest homes were not sufficient to tb~. 
people's needs. One would only appland .the pro- being made iC:' 
it were hot for the extraorhary exaggeration of R d a n  'propi: 
g m d a  I am reBJnded of a story told me by a Fimihh friend who w a ~  
a memiber of a sehi-official party, hospitably received in R d a  I& 
1935. They were s h o h  various statione of the new Mowa*. 
d w a y ,  bat not taken to ride on any trainR Then they were a&&j 
&&ir opinion. + M y  friend praieed the artistic appearance of W' 
etatiom but suggested that the bneineee of a subway was trampow. 
tion and d e d  why time, money and energy had not been spent on 
the exensioII of the 8 e h &  rather .than on the beautification of th, 
stations. This, he said; had been the principle in the developme& 
of s h y  services in Paris, London and New York. His guide,!& 
very intelligent woman, replied in some anger, 'That is a capit&& 
lie; there are no eubways in capitdiat lands." 
I had a somewhat similar experience myself when I was showij.' 
throogh the publiehing plant of PM& The building8 wcne new 
and pretentious but already bepjnning to crack. There wen admi* 
able reereatiori rooms ax$ elinics. I was escorted by three or fo 
people representing different departments and invited to ad 
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the mechanical equipment. In nearly every case the gaxide would 
my, T h e  New York Times hasn't anything like that." It $ true 
that I saw larger flat pm- than exist in America. Indeed I w u  
aissured that they had ta be ordered from Gemany. I agreed that 
the New York Times bad n o w  like &em, and I tactfdy refrained 
from adding that m b e r i a  fa m d e r  papers ,would -use mtary 
pmmea. I also drained from adding that in the New York Timer 
building an o f f i e l y  guided party would not have to ehcm a p m  
five timeb to f d y  armed m1diem a8 we did within the P r d  pl.nt 
Ag&, let me make it plain that I' do a@-dticiee the Russia 
of 1937 for the lsk of rotary presses. Later on a Rnssian official 
who had been in America explained to me that the trouble waw that 
they did not have the machinery for making the paper nscsssary 
for wch presses became other sorts of machinery had to have 
priority. It 8ee11.d a reasonable explanation. what 'was less reason. 
able was the propaganda which made Prevdds employees so happily 
unaware of the d facts of the world in which they live. 
To return to the subject of d a l  income for the Russian 
mawm. It is true that a great deal has bdn done in adult education, 
in the bniI1&g of libraries and the encouragement of mllsic, the 
ballet and the theatre. Workers can'get very cheap tickets for very 
fine performances. 
But in the general field of education progress is by no meam 
altogether in- the right direction. I have referred to the reprtaen%ation. 
in a echool, which I visited. A far more serious situation ie the 
p w h g  mequality of education. A decree of October 2, 1940. tired 
the tuition fee for secondary schdols - roaghly corresPo~diIng; to 
our high ecbooIs except. that t h  emphasize technical education 
- at 150 to Z* rubles per year. For universities it mna from 300 
to 500 dies. According to KO-&, six hundred thoasand students 
of parenu too poor to pay had to Ieave echool. The same decree 
. - 
conecriiptedted children over fiften whose parents oodd not pay for 
a mo<darlr'dn&tion to foG. yeam~compdsory'~r;vipQ in jobs p+ 
dded by the Administration of Labor ~e&rves fdIowing*a vocationhl 
training which may last from six ikonths to two years. Today,. a a  
cord&% to - the '&areftdIyi dbc-knted 'facts -grknted by 'Arth* 
Kmler ,  sp&iai mhools are reserved for kI;iI&en of the b-aacracy 
and by decree of Angnst 23, 1943,- cadet scihools (''sttvOrm Milipry 
 dadd deb*) &re establi~hed with special :exitranee facilities for 
for them hi#hs ackdd.m- 
poor f d m ~  bat apr hrrrba$ 
I** ~ f b f f f q t 3 * 4 1 0 6  ?, 
in& .- - -.,. . . 
and money are heaped upoh workers who e x d  ths m a 1  norm. 
And' then the nom ir  promptly d ~ d !  Stakhanov b I f  war, a 
yoang coal mina in the Donetz Beein who, in the summer of 1935, 
cut first, fourteen times the average norm of coal, and laset, 
two thna the aremag?. Soon there were Stakhm~vitee in every mine, 
facbry and @cx&md 'coktive, The 0emt  of thek war 
not .only .pessonaI exce&qe, but the fact, as Stakhanov de~rlyfraid, 
that they were leqden af a new -division of labor under whi& fax 
instan- .one mon cnt;w.l and the others. did submdiary work. Thie 
w.s new -in Rnseia bat old in the western world. The propaganda, 
hawwer,. was new, and rationalization of labor in industry - to 
use an EngZish term - beeame something "specifically Soviet," some 
thing "specifically Social.ist." No less an authority than Molitov 
explained that there wm no over rtrain about it, but rather it wm 
a b t t e r  "of a CUttwsd attitude towards work-" In general, St& 
hanovitee, are beneficidw of the extraordinary differentials which 
I have already cited and it .htw been the bt18irra~ of labor unions to 
advance "dture" among their members in thb Stakhanovite tmwe 
rather than to protect their specific interests visa-vie m8pqement. 
But- rhe State does not t m s t  praise, monetary reward and 
premxre dlpmgh company mione to establi~h morde m i~-factories. 
During tlqe war patri~tism has doubtlees been an additional motive 
in R d o  rn in all*.coamtries 'md perhaplr to a greater d e p  in 
R d a  thqn in some countries; But even during the war pataiiotiem 
war not expo+ In December, 1941, a11 -branches of industry, mining 
aal transportation directly or indirectly connected with the war 
were put qnder martial law, and not only absenteeban but carelee 
nem and w i n g  became capital offemma- 
. T h  was omly an exaggeration of  control^ and penalties which 
had existed for some yeam before R d a  was involved in the great 
war. The revival of the system of internal passports in 1932 gave tbe 
Goyemtmt great power over the lives of 911 individnala From 1939 
on, a special labor book was b e d  to each employee in which 
m&rnent llet down its co-eats 0 n - h  record. I t  became a' 
criminal off- to employ. a man who did not p-t his book- 
Penalties, even before the impoGticm & martial law, were pued up 
and foremen were given power to discharge workem for various of- 
fehdlr withorit notice. and without any s&h appeal as eixiete in every 
tmiozi  hop :in America. Insnran.ck benefita and aIl  social seeces 
were made dependent on length of employment and a change of em- 
ployment meant starting at the bottom of the scale. Altogether the 
eystem even before Russia was at war was far more rigorous than 
the British conscription of labor in war. 
The fbal  defense of all this offered by Soviet apologis~ is 
that the workers are not really exploited becaw they are working 
for the proletarian state, that is for themselves. It is doubtle~ true 
that this fact does bring some satisfaction to the workers. Theoreti- : 
eally and perhaps actually a good deal of the money which in a : 
capitalist country would be wasted by absentee owners is in the 
Soviet Union spent in behalf of the public or at any rate of the 
state. Nevertheless, it would appear that the'income of proletarian 
miUionaires, especially now that rights of inheritance have been 
reestablished, is about as much unearned incomeas that of Ameri- 
can mi13ionairea And it is no deprivation to that Stalinist 
fret&, a "proletarian millionaire" or a well paid bureaucrat that he 
cannot buy either a factory or land of his own eo long as he can 
enjoy the mal benefits-of ownership in capitalist countries without 
financial &k. 
I repeat that those who believe that private capitalism is being 
reestabliehed in the U. S. S. R. are completely nristaken. Neither 
is there the slightea chance o$ a return in Russia to an lmplannd 
ecommy whieh its American adkc-atea miacaIl "free enterpri~e.~ 
On tbe other hand what haa taken the place of private capitalism 
in the U. S. S. R o  b not se&alim, not wen state socialism, for th.f 
amam& some dinet power!of the workem over the state and tha 
\ 
p- of pmdaction and distribution through their cithemhi# 
and through their free d o n a  They do not have sach power imdei 
the Russian dietatomhip, and its economy is best dwribed as state, 
capitalism. Under it there is developing a strong tendency for new 
social classes to emerge to take place of the old. Unquestionably the 
enormotm bureaucracy te~.& to ,constitate a social clam, itseIf cub- 
divided into rigorom h e a r d e s  of rank and pay. This claw tenth 
to be sslkperpetuating baoaatlle of i~ superior finandal ability !a
educate its children for the better paid pwts. hidentally it is today 
abut the only clam that can afford divorce! 
To a democratic eodaliet the size of the bnreancraey itselfi 
constitutes a warning of a d-r which d a l i a m  must avoid. David . 
Dallin, whom book The R d  Saviet R d  giveb the best account 
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of tbe rim of the new dasaar, in Rusaia, illustrates the growth of the 
bureaucracy deepite the red deeire of reeponeible officials to curb 
it. Among many ilhtrations he pates the Soviet ecanomic jonrnal 
Problems of Ecmomy to ahow how many more offiice workers 
are required in R d m  foetoriea than in American factories of corn 
p d e  she. There are also-more foremen and techniciaqe* Thus a 
cod mine bearing the name of Lenin "employs eleven times as many 
tmhdcians & the h r i c a r a  mine" of comparable size. Ffom 193236 
dm number of Gov~l~megt employees increased 25% although the 
workers only increased 17%. Between 1937 and 1939 in the maehine 
indmtry the namber of prodnctive workers decreased 5% while 
the total number of employeai increased 13%. This, let me add, is not 
peculiarly a R d a n  problem as figures of certain developments in 
America under the New Deal will make clear. 
You will see from tkis brief account that the question how 
you wodd fare in respect to materid thingb as well as in respect to 
imponderable satisfactions if you were a RUBSian, depends very 
mu& oewhat kind of work are doing and what rank you enjoy. 
The one certain thing that can, be said is that up to the hi+t 
levels of the bkeaucracy you could not by any -etch of the imagima- 
tion be cJlad a &tisen in indastry. 
The theory to which Secretary H & R ~  Wallace and othem have 
given mpremion, that although there is no political democracy as 
we u n d e - d  it in the Soviet Union, there is another mrt of dem- 
Tacy, -a1 or economic, is completely denied by facts- whieh we 
have cited. Lack of r a k  and other ainsiderations may bring 
eathfactiona to the masses, but it b a complete &,use of language to 
eay that the  constitute any sort of democracy. In fact it wodd be 
impodble for a modem highly centraked atate, over any con- 
eiderable period of time, to deny civil liberties and political democ- 
racy and efficiently to grant a democracy of economic controls in 
the.worir shop or the agricultural collective. The whole purpose 
of dictatership is to establish authority and discipline, and that 
authority and dbdpline are nowhere more needed, in the opinion 
of the dictator, than in the b k e m  of production and distribution. 
Even if the d i c t a ~ r  so desired, it wodd be an hoaeibility for him 
completely to control the general organs of information and com- 
munication, and yet permit hie people as workers to get the free 
access to e c o n d c  f a e ~  upon which any effective democracy would 
depend. We - r l l 4 thw &it life b not oolnpletely lopi-dal and air b 
aohn.ther6 ik it0 ;cibmlmts of good or evil, bnt the totalitarian &atd 
m c d  e x h  aed &y trae induetrial. d 6 - y  or even :any 
a p p h  to h.' T b . ~ b t o r y  of the evolution of totalitmhnhmi W 
R d a - i e  la shew perfect illtmtrdion of this fact. Whatever pq&+ 
logid ddera t iOne  mar d i p ;  poverty tolerable to ,ths hq 
ad&& r + t y  d -~rifiifioe nor a a t d  partkipation- .in nbe 
. * & d e n '  of d~ - n d c  p- ia one of .&em. ' . L i s i i : b t : ,  
-/. . s  > ' . f 
CHnpTnnm * * *  : 
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FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY M THE SOVIET UNION 
EIWiridty, *it has dways bsen the eonterntitin d st&-. 
d P a E i h  &abw of ophtion thdt the-isyetem they derire to 
w d d - ' k  ah in freedom -aa Well a; in . .&terid. . 
\What'*tsxhv&'alreaap.' =zi abdnt the life of a R u d m  of* 'dW 
makes it cleat thpf he hm nothring llike sdoh a aegree of freed- .ar; 
we haw in capitdist' Am6ica.'hd that's far  from what it Ought d 
be. But let . us I look a little more alossfg into athe positisnn of a ~4 
&$ 'd sti*in. 1.' 
Hb whole life is peculiarly at the diepoeal of the state. He 
is subject to military conscription whichohas been one of the Ohief 
curses of our modern age, and even in peacetime to something e l m  
to labor conscription. If he falls into the bad graces of the state 
he may be condemned to a long period of forced labor by imcmd 
trial. He lives under the constant surveillance of the secret police 
who are reaponeible to the organization now known as NKVD. It iu 
doubtful if even the Nazi Gestapo maintained eo elaborate, sq 
ubiquitous, and so effective an organization. 
The totalitarian state permits no such right of. citizens ta 
form social, economic and political associations as we enjoy aa .a 
matter of 'course in America. Even a social club has to exist by pei- 
mission of the etate. The partial reestablishment of the rights of tbQ 
Church still leave it the creature of a state whose highest authorities 
are themselves atheists. At best the State grants freedom of r i d .  
practice which is very different f r o ~ ~ i  freedom of conscience. 
: . '  . T ~ b i o w . l & p ~ - b d t h e v ~ ~ ~ t ~ d t h e U . S . S . R  
d i t  c0ntmIs tbe . w b k  'epprratas of the eta- %din'& plea that 
the &teen Sovie t -hdEc% which 00&~r2ee the So* Union ere 
virtidjr indepcadentk m e d s g l w  ar, hmg as the hig& clentrdimd 
rnomalithie Commtisgkt Pmty and tbe ubiquitow ilecretpob ~MMBWQI 
all the guyemmente af the U ~ I L  & a matter d fmt, &IJ; bas 
beem beard of any activities of m y  supposedly independent Com- 
b b of W a i  The mighty Russian Army is of necessity a central- -, 
ired mhchipe. Maimibky who was seated at San Francisco to rep-- 
&nt the %sine in which Republic he ia n o d a l l y  Foreign Com- 
' 
n o  moFe hd=pendent of the Kremlin than Molotov. miesar, . *  I " 
Jn tbpe the GD-unist Party pas itself damacratia 
internally, but Party Cong-es have become fbw and far between 
and more and more they have ratified the decisions made by the 
dicta& Jh thie and.otber respects the Party has b m e  the kerpakt 
of the' leader. So strong a champion of R d a  M Harold hdd -de 
plored this fact at length and in coneiderable detail in talting to 
me befoe World War II. 
st&-& dGtator is enlogillred in 'Rnasia e t h  an extravagance 
scarcely, &&kded by Japanese veneration for' an Emperor who 'ie the 
Son .of''~&ven, and he hae bmparably  greater positive powers 
than thti'&upe1y)rm So t~remendone is his Muence in all departments 
of Eitethak one of his 'American admbrs, Richard E. Lanteibach, 
th inks it while to record the facts that Shostakovich d v e d  
$talin9s d M k e  of his operatic rent- M y  Maebeth fk Mtensk, 
and &at an -airplane designer was neither demoted nor put *in a 
concentration camp for rejecting one of Stah's e r i t i b  of his 
dd-!, * 
~.Tbrti is ody one voice on the radio in all  midv R-a md 
that% the: voice of the dictatorship. There ie no press but that which 
is owned and; controlled directly by the Government, like I m x d u ,  
or by the Oemmunist Party, Eke Pmuda, or by =me part d the 
etate appatatb, military or cnU When Mr. Lanterbach fix& the 
Motuxwite in mmal ways %etter iuformd &an the merage New 
Yorker," he is making a generakhatium which he can ~wum17 sup- 
port OR hb E m i a  knowledge of R d r m  and his expeerinnee in 
R d  and which b logically impossible d e e s  one h to beliewe 
&at the beat Wormed New Yorkers ue tham who read the X I y  
W i w b  .nd. - only the Daily W o r k .  , 
Actudlyf'-the probibition of fomign papers to the 
rnams, eve& P l i h  whe might be able to read them, the extent- 
R d a  and the virtual - i m p d i l i t y  of penetrbg it ,by 
ra&w plas dk ~ i v e  propaganda of the state and its 
d t  in t?;e a W  thing to a complete dominatioaa .of eve 
nsind that has been remrdd in hieho y. 
, Under -theee o i r c ~ t a n c e s  it may not mean much to 
voters that in the only generid election held under the supp 
democratic,new constitution the ballots on which they k e d  - 
it wm't healthy not ~o vote - there appeared only the 
or Commanist approved candidate for office. On the sp 
lots which I saw there was not even a little spaee as on the .Germma 
ballots to vote no. 
Joel Seidman and I tried to tell the etory of liberty and dem&T 
racy in the U. .S. S. R. fairly with the sop@ortin~ evidence in a 
phlet, Rurdq Dem~crcrcy or Dictatorship? publiihed by the ~ e a g d '  
for Indnetrial Democracy in 1939. The most interesting thing 
that pamphlet was our, complete failure to get an answer to it f- 
andy Communist or champion of Stalin. For at least a year the L. I. D. 
teed various persons ending finally with Earl Browder Uar 
Some hf &them abused us for kiting the pamphlet at 
woaid Ooneent even to try to answer the facts which 
The facts have not yet, been altered for the better 
Indeed, the war seems to have increased very greatly S t d i d 8  
for f~rced Hbor andthe sppplp of it from Poles, Baltic . . i 4  
Germans as well ae Rpsaians. 
t 
Before we turn to this qaeation of forced labor, which is *, 
blackest, moat infamous spot on the R d a n  record, it would hrt 
well to eay something about the proceseee of justice in the U. 
Revolutionary justice to ordinary criminals started on the 
tion that most crime was the result of a bad environment. C 
punishment at fimt was abolished, and in theory, and to a c 
able extent in practice, Russian procedure for the trial and 
ment of ordinary crimes was enlightened. As late as 1937 I 
Bolshevo, a community of what we would call paroled p 
was about the most encouragiq$ thing I saw in Russia. - 
Nevertheless, punishment has become very harsh. Long a&: 
the death sentence was restored. In 1932 it was made applicable @:: 
tbdt or injury to coUectivised property. By a decree of April 7, 
1935, capital pmbhment was extended-to children down to ihe age 
of twelve. k t l e r  quo- the decree and ad& that a law "which 
treats a child of twelve as a grown up in a Criminal Court has no 
pardel in the legislation of any civilbed country - or, for that 
matter, any uncidhed one." 
Bat the ey~tematic use not only of punishment bat of ter 
rorism is reserved for politid offenders and their f d e s .  The 
famous purges of 1936-38 are the beet publicized proof of thb and 
they have been denounced and justified at great length. I have thew 
comments to make: 
1) Whether or not the famous old Boleheviks, Lenin98 c10m 
associates, who confemed to cromething or other, were guilty or not, 
their public triale and the publicity given them had less to do with 
the procems of j d c e  than ;with foreign and domestic propaganda 
in behalf of S t W 8  foreign policy. In the first trials the accwed 
were char~ed with conspiring with the western "democratic" powere 
ag*t Stalin's regime. In the later trials the Germans were the 
villaha. The reamn was a shift in R d a n  foreign policy. 
- 2) The defense often heard in America that Stakin for-w a 
criminal conspiracy between high Russian functionaries and the 
Germans and prevented it by the purges with the result that there 
were "no Quislings in Russian is untenable. It was Stalin himself, 
not the men condemned in the purges, who made a quasi-alliance 
with Hitle~ which Hitler perfidiously broke and there were Qairlings 
1 
, or traitors in Russia, including high Army officers, among them 
General Wwv. The RUB~L~S  in German uniform who fell prisoner 
to the Americana and British on the invation of weetern Europe were 
not all impressed into the s e ~ c e  by fear of German punishment. 
General om& Bradley eaye that between 100 and 150 thowand of 
them were fighting with the Germans on the western front. 
3) It & almost equally a condemnation of the R d a n  regime . 
whether you believe that it condemned innocent men on false evi- 
dence or that it had so failed in its fundamental purpose that most 
of the crumiving fathers of the Bolehevist Revolution were led to 
conepire against their old associate, the dictator Stalin. 
I nsed to believe that the purges, like mme of the plots and 
connterplots in the Roman Empire, concerned only the governing 
tad didmot touoh the maseee very closely; but ths a& r 
Rurei& in. farced .labor camps, the tr8nBfomation of the ,W ', 
maniet Paity ar the r d t  of the putgee, and other tmtimony 
* -  * -  
-ted by K o d e r  and Dallin, coypel me to believe that s c a m n - #  2 
family harSbeen without lome relative who fell victim to * 'q  ;" 
terror long after any foreign or domestic attack threatened it. Ddkq 
who give61 the careful and objective treatment to the 8ubjee-t ' X 
in. his bod,' T$U Real Souiet &ask, reports that h v d  labor. q y  
lpaostly ,of so-called p'.litical offenders, became so great t4Ci 
in the, w l y  thhiiee pablication of figares was. dkontind.. Tllq. 
main aw of these sentences was to furnish the immense amount af, 
forced labor which in Dallin's *opinion had become an emnokc 
neae&ty under Stah's system. In 1928 forced laborers numbed  . 
'aboat'thirty thousand; by 1934-35 there were between five and.'&' 
mBlion. The preeent number is not accujately known, but both D a U  . 
and K ~ t l e r  pteeent estimates or evidence too detailed to quote her<- 
that there are between eight and twenty million slave workers. ' ,  
Dallin reckons that there may be about as many forced  laborer^ ot , 
various categories as "free" industrial workers in Rnssia today. 
Some of the forced workers labor camps are crimin& 
. They have the best treatment, the best hope of release, aild an, 
of- pat in charge of the  politicab. The .second group, accordling 
to Dalhx, is composed of the surviving "Kulaks," victims of 
do-, 'agricultnral collectivisation of the early thirties. Thd 
&id are tsurvlvi.~@ participants in peasant mutinies which we$ 
f&ly frequent in the thirties and were punished by sending 4U && 
inhabitants 'ot the villages in which they occurked into exile. Tiid 
fourth ie composed of alleged "counter revolutionists;" the fj!Wta,' 
of Coinmunist oppositionists; and the sixth, members of liationil 
groups. These are particularly numerous sin- the beginning Qt 
World War 11. The Russians deported between one and one and j 
half million Poles during the period of the German alliance. wid 
them went thousands of people from the little Baltic states.  late^^^ 
after Hitler's attack on Stalin, most Rumians of German dewma 
no matter how long their residence in Rpssia, ware exiled. S p b  
men for Poles and the Baltic peoples claim that deportation h d  
been renewed on a large scale now that Russian authority has bein* 
ertablished in the Baltic countries and in what used to be eastern 
Poland. It is also alleged that the Rusaiam have already a great r n a n ~  
Germam in Jabor .canam as well aa some Rumdans and Bdgarim 
who were n& e x a t e  in the pargae under R h  dirfxtion aft%; 1 them muutrieh fall nndar S t d h 9 8  control. It is praboble that. them 
forei- are not worn -tad than the R d a n r .  Indeed a R d a s  
general told an bepiean d.my acqnaintance who pzo&&d about 
the treatment of the Poles, that hie complaint was f o o W  The 
es are treated no worse than our own Ruseiane in work camps." 
That treatment ir alm06t universally bad. It ir a p8ychological 
p d i l i t y  to condemn thowaxids of human beings to the t la very 
of work camps a d  &Ln have w p s  humanely mn. Stalin is not a 
fanatic or sadist like Hitler or Himmler. He is not interested in 
e- en$&?- ,q races. Nevertheb conditions in B d a n  
wok camp8 are ypq .;m;lar + ~aditiOnr, that the ~erm& estPb- 
lished and the d& &e probably' au high. I &all not, p&bh 
atmcity axits. Readen cap, find the 'fiqte aet forth in the pag6 of 
Dallin and ~oesfler. I have heard'homble corroborktive e&d<dce,i 
which u yet I &at p*t, 'from sotha  which I b&eJe- to be 
- .  ' - .  mpIe-iy icctuate. - 
It 'b &po*ant to remember that both men and woxkm are1 
t foi long periode of years into tkb slavery. In many, perhap8 
mmt cams, f d e s  do not even.know tha ad&- of vidims con. 
dexked witbout any public trial or defense. Oftea the yean, roll on 
and the f&e~  ciunnot learn whether the anfortunate rhbmbem 
are alive dead. Sometimes they too are deported. The treatment 
of familiem as hostages is common. One of the -gat thine &mitt 
the erulogbte of Russia from Wendell W-e to Richard Lantetbach 
is their d p l e t e  failure or extreme reluctance to m'ention facts 
about forced labor, some of which muet be ppparent even to a 
casual viaitor. In 1937, although I was of course carefully guided, 
I eaw the outaide of at 1-t two work camp% and I MW mend 
score foiced laborem toiling on the Mosoow-Volga C m d  under 
armed guard Doubtlem conditions are not uniformaUy bad; $ome 
thousandts of workers from time to tima are reported ~'reetod* to 
n o d  life, but the death rate in the camps m far aa can be die- 
covued is extraordinarily high. Thk is a situation completely in- 
d e f d l e  by any democratic or d a l i s t  etandards. It would have 
been criminal at any stage in the world'e history. No atimate .of 
Russian achievement can be trusted which omits discdon d 
labur jmt as no c r i t i b  of RnssiPn achievement is fair 
27- 
which f& to applaud S W a  handling of the racial prob1em On .. 
the record as we haw examined it, the failure to achieve frsedoam 
is even mom m g  and tragic than the failure to achieve - 
The third member of the familiar trinity: plenty, freedolq and 
peace, requka an examination of Stah's foreign policy. 
THE NEW RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM 
One thing is m e :  Stalin'a foreign policy has been enombdg. 
m d d .  Man or Lenin might have his doubta about it but Ma&- 3 
veK *odd applaud. No ruler has ever better conibined the @ti= 
of the l3o.n and the fox in dealing with his enemies and aJUie%. 4 .J 
BoIsbevilr rule was definitely antidlittarit in its begking. I 
Stalin himself hated the.irmy uniforms which, to judge from pictures 
and reports, he now adores. The workers of the world were to win 
r world revolutian whose pioneers, soldiers and leaders were to . 
the Conuammist Party and not the army. The Red Army was borP .: 
of revolutionary warfare in Rneeia and resistance to the indefensibla, 
bnngling and incompetent intervention of Britain, France and 
America. After the settlement of the Polish boundary following th' 
defeat of the Red Army before Warsaw - itself part of the revolw ' 
tionary etroggle - Lenin and later Stalin pursued in Europe a 
9 etudiously non-aggressive policy in respect to the use of armed forces, %d 
Ae the years went on the Communist Government conclgded 
all sorts of non-aggreeeion treaties with the Baltic state6 and Poland. 
Ia relations with the government of preHitler Germany were good 21 
even when the German Communist Party threatened revolutiga 
Until after Hitler had come to power, Stalin's chief fears and rnp 
kj 
picions were. of Britain and France. This wae a natural d e d u w  ' :$ 
not only from his philosophy of inevitable conflict with capi-. 4 
most strongIy represented in those coantries, but a h  from the$ . 
original hostility to the Bolshevik revolution. It was not until 1m. 
that fear of Nazi power led Stalin to play with a "united frontn with* -. 
&e democracies against fascism. 
and d clashes a~ there were arose out of Japanem agpmiow 
Stalin took .no military action tbe years following 1927 when 
Qniang Kai Shek threw ,out his Russian Communist advbers and 
tried to liquidate Chin- Co-tmism. The Soviet Union did expand 
by aaqtliring an overlordrbip in. Outer Mongolia somewhat W a r  
to that which Japan latai acquired in Manchuria, but it relied 
largely on native leadck and f d o m  to win power as it did in 
ib law d e f i i n t e ~ o w ~ l d f i p  n westernmost China. Thi~  was a pop 
tent of the methad which Stalin has &ace developed in Eastern 
Europe. x 
Stalm first used military force in Europe in support of the 
Spanish Loyalists. The force was limited and the Loyalim paid 
for it not only in gold but in acceptance of much intervention in their 
domeetic affairs. Stalin was probably motivated, at least in part, 
by a desire to promote that world revolution which in his succeeefu1 
struggle against Trotsky he  ha^ never abandoned but merely post- - 
pokd in time and subordinated to Russian security which is essential 
to it. Thie equity, he donbtIe88 reflected, could bi, served if weetern 
Europe o d d  be divided and weakened in the Spanish struggle. 
Con&rning what Stalin might have done in the Gecho- 
~lovakian crisis if 'the western powers had stood firm and France 
had called upon him to honor0their alliance, there are two oppdte  
. opinions, both backed by respectable advocates. It is certain that 
Britain and France gave Stalin no reason for co&dence and it is 
equally certain that the purges in the first of which the western dem- 
ocracies were lindi~ted as the foreign enemy, could inspire po con- 
fidenoe in' Paris and London. It was therefore less wrprieigg than 
most of the world believed that Stalin suddenly should make a 
quasi-alliance' with Hitler in the A e r  of 1939. 
It is now the style to eay that he made or consented to thia 
agreement with HMer merely to gain time for an inevitabIe war 
against him. This scarcely fits the facts BO far as we know them. 
S t a b  war, not in so weak a positioa that he had either to fight 
Hitler or help him, and the nature of his alliance wm aggrdve. 
It gave him a frse hand to take without ai~y excuse the three little 
BaItic mtaes and a l m ~ d  halt of P o h d  d ~ p i t e  his numeroue treaties 
of non-aggdon. After the R d a n s  had ocmpied their part of 
Poland Stalin te1egraphed von Ribbentrop, in reply to birthday 

clahmd that. the wrtr (iphieh beeaqe holy d y  when- R h  ww 
attacked) w& m p d y  cp ipngeridi~t straggle. 
. It. ir iiapdb1e- to' exaggerate the tenacity and comage 6f 
R d a n  .neshtme. I&Iep ~*UI i s  surely brden on the -Rwian an* 
m Nap~lem 'hadb.lThe B d a n  regime, military an& econamaic, 
wrb far better dapted-t&i~acessfd war than th i  world had thoaght. 
h r h g  & f t i ~  m p  af . the btmggle, Communim wrtl, somiwhat 
h d i t e d  e-' ib~Rtwr&i . bi ' 3ts quasi-alliance ' with N e r k  
Stalin (who had beco* 'a. jpeai- Rnsaian patrim' b l f  a l t h d  
bop in. Georgiq) foand it. highly desirable to develop the intense 
love that :of ~ty&m .felt - for their homelkd. Later, with 
sac- at the,..battle-fvPi the  party' position improved. Stalin 
made dfficienf'& 'd; if iq eivil and military affairs and began onq 
more to qmpha&k ~ o e d s t  among the people. . 
Under the strea6 of danger S t a b  made agreemenu with the 
Pobh  hvelpment in Exile. Ignorring Mblotov's statement of 1939 
he repatqd1y . . -  declqed: "J alwaye wanted a strong, independent 
fWu$" Bnt as. ,his military ~ 0 8 t h  improved he made it dear 
that he:inte&ded t6 dictate'the eastern boundaries and the nature of ' 
the gov-ent of thie ''~trong, independent, ~ o G d . "  . , - *.A ' -  \ 
. It'became increasingly plain that -Stab, who had --me to 
think of himself as the successor to the Ruseian Czars iq national 
leaded& remembered the old Ruseian desire, embodied in+ the 
secret treaties .of 1917 to become overlord of Europe, a t  lenet np to 
the German boundary..Ae we have said he took over Pan-Slprian. 
He made .con~es~ions to the Orthodox Church thereby winning favor 
among its feflbw believers in the Balkans. Bnt beyond thh he had 
what the Cllur,never hod: a world-wide CQtntnnubt mwement. blind- 
ly lopi .%.: hipl which no peraecdon had been able .completely to 
extirpate. -.even under German omupation. 
'The American Coxnmdet Party is typical of world commorii 
iswe Bdbm 1938 no ab& of Rooakelt was too gnat. Whea S& 
wanted tRd a - da f ron~  . heriaan Comnniets e n p p o d  ir a d  
Roo~eOeIt. In tha ~ 6 i w  of 1959*-eame -the Hitier quda1Eilmde. 
Amdean Coihund~,  caught by tmpria; rapidly f& h h e  ind 
denouiced '' the .w& which ov&i=ra weatem Enmpe as- pxGely G 
peridht. Bitler attacked Stalin in Jrme, 1941. Then th6 war b&me 
holy and the Communists eeponsed collabotation with -Roo&velt'u 
type of capiphm When Russia was safe, the French leader Dnclas, - 
after visiting Mamow, denounced this as betrayal of Marxism where- 
upon his American comrades indulged in an OE& of repentance, 
S*'s control ja complete despite his formal abolition of the Third 
Intematimd. That merely made it easier to use Commdta with- 
oat -offieid responsibility. Whether or not dm R d a n  
• 
dictator can forever use an international movement as another , m y  -:i 
in mpport of world revolution of which the Red Army h the chief 
agent rem* to be seen. He can do it today. , 
? 
Stalin developed a formula which permitted coneiderable ,i 
variety'in application under which he could use native factions in . .,: 
setting up puppet states, which he could annex or not amex as best ,$ 
saited hi, interests After the Getman breakdown he was able to 
1.t send into Poland and the other smaller countr3es Communists whose - n d  +
conndons with those lands had been broken so long that they 
were in effect Rnaeian citizens. 4 
NoMnally the factions aided and put in power by Rmim 
a d e s  are always "peaiants and workers? From the hexation ot 
the Baltic states up to his present dealings with Germany, St& 
has been trying-with just how much success &mains to be see- 
to identify Rnssian enemies with the claw enemies of the ma- 
Be has, however, been willing to let landlord@, Junkers, and cap& 
g e n d  pmge themelves by joining his committees; And it'wtlk 
moxie other than Prof. Oscar Lange, later a champion of Stalin's 
L u b h  Government for Poland, who k t  told me that when Poland 
was odp ied  in 1939 it was socialist and non-Communist leadem of 
the peasante and workers rather than leadem of the bourgeoisie whom 
the R d a 6 s  liquidated and in disproportionate nainbera deported 
among the million or milliq and a half Poles who wem\&nt ta 
Rnasian work camps. Something of the same sbrt has gone an in 
the Balkan countries and in the parts of Gemany occupied by the 
Red Armies. Spokeemen for the lit& Baltic n a t i o ~  allege that 
deportation and imprisonment continue in those co&triee principally 
among potential leaders of pop& -opposition. The most inf~mow 
il1mtration of this policy was Stab's axecution d- the f8-mo~ 
Pohh labor ana socialist leaders, Ehrlich and Alter, after he 
wtablhhd nominal friecndly relations with the Polish Governmeat 
in Exile-relations which these padonate anti-Nazie, after. the& 
deaee from tha prison. into whioh Stalin had thrown them on b 
first occnpation ~f Poland, were trying to strengthen- 
- S t a h  haa been abla ta atend Rrmian political ~verlordshiP 
under -various politid de&mrn He annexed the Baltic states and 
eastern Polaud tu.the Soviet Union as rapidly as he could reestabhh 
a Communkt P q  -d legitimathe his act by plebbcitee in which 
it war worth yonr life to vote ''no." 
Oechoslovalria 6s - tied to the Soviet Union by a military 
alliance; The Red Army is still living off the country as t h i s  is 
writtea, and Benes was forced to take a Communist as Miniaer of the 
Interior. He has followed the Russiap model by decreeing the ex- 
pulsion of more than two million Sudeten Germans from the homes 
of t h e  ammtors, ,and he has ceded part of the old Czechoslovakian 
temtory to B d a  which had ,a claim upon it in terme of ethnic 
loyalties. Communists always want, and usually get, in coalitioan 
cabinets the posts which give them control over the police, parga 
and the political apparatus of the country- The rest, they calculate, 
will ba %My* . . .  
k 
power is dominrnt in the puppet governmeTit ob- 
Bdg- R d a ,  Hungary, and probsbly even Anstiia ahbngh 
Viema bmtder joint occupation and the Renner government c& 
~ i k u . s c d  .&id democrats- Except in Awtria, Melong darnmwis~ 
were exma in p q e q  and American and British reportem, brmi- 
ne88me-n 'aka -even military aaffieiah were alxtdst w M y  exdadd 
from the W t e d  Baans  - a fact acknowledged by the Potdm 
D e t k a t i ~  which ~n~0unce.d that now reporters would be admitted. 
The Ueited'S~tee ww at ymr with Bulgaria as won pr, it was at war 
with Germany and om aviatots d-yed a considerable part of . 
Sofia, i ~ '  ~ p i a l  S t a h  was only at war with Bulgaria fom days 
after Bd&wian anti-fascist~ had already negotiated an armistice 
with Gmat lhiain and America. But he's the red baee totby- 
In ~&plavia, %din f o d  Tito, a native Commnnin~ a 
natural l&der .nd in due time campelled the Britbh to tramfew to 
him th&r.smppoa ia the civil w~ which iatermitantly raged in that 
&Wed somitry eom during the Gehan omupation. Tit0 may be 
the people% 'cbiee but he has -felt obliged to d e  by .term& 
(See an thh R H. Markham'@ kt- in the N. Y- Times, Awe 19, 
1945). As a miward 'for Chumhill's shitt to Tito, Stalin let Great 
dth @be &&f iatke3~than. the Comumbt movm&t d i tdpheipd - 
d i i h j e  best that dtk'be *id foiZSt is that h pd-.mbm mgad 
* 
tbaa the )Sari' brad. - ' 
, , t . > i , i  :h>&&&.&@ c&&$a:*&w.:*eIw*@.#&aPe 
wubed the exiled govenunente. We never a w e d  for dcdv 
' 
w W F i b p  B - G ~ G ~ ~ * , T ~ ~ F ; B P  w -Xab.or T-w, 4. Patedw 1 
It. h snt. ,qqt& ; R w h p  4 ~ .  Ria , .  . - poky, bpt- h r i - ,  i.cL . d 
p d i q  after. Pepd Q+r -whish crpated. a vacuum in - E q p  *a 
ampro- from Stalin in qqpd 'tq Paland wns,so little that it 
'i~(;i;'~ave our Gonor ~U&BS' &i 'ii.6 very &&ip' camm@ityr 
1 . .  . ;  . '  ,: a f . ' a  . -, v . . .  J . 
A t n  a - . % .  . . . .  t . , . . . c  
..,. ; Stab'~ golieJ. - tow-. G e m *  :.k Beemi k r b e  with mh# * 
wL have been,ddrib.inp.-Dm* ~Eosbig ysua d &e Gs- - *be .IW*~B h d  ~ W O  . S ~ B  to bow ~t .it s n i d  JR-& 
he .go*blo"g with the -Al&im .to the destmCthn d G e e  
with .hwmnrmw that he could ~ i & , u p  the pi- at leak tu ~ Q d i  
84 
, . & f' ,yestern Eqope, -some hope was dfered to 1taly and 
p-1~. w,f deliverance to S p a  with which Stalin would . a m  
~ o w l & ~ , : a a $ d  about any sozt of help to D-qk,. 
~ e d * ~ . ~ ' H o l l a n d ,  and that also probably suits ~ t a h ' b  plans. 
N Q W X Q ~ ' ~  &id about any regionals federatiom a future. U&ed 
Statq '4 '4i@ope, strong enough t o  etand in relation of paztnerehip 
rathe~,.-'dpn ' dependence to the' ~ i g  T h .  This certainly suits 
s m 1 & . ' * ,  
A If wae done at Potadam about Stah's important 
demtulde on Tnrkey, it does not appear. Neither G there my rh 
ference $0 toe growing conflict of interest in which the powemion 
of oil b'd great f ieor in Iran and the whole Wddh Eaa : . *- 
Aa for &many, the center of intereet in the Potsdam -p* 
ceedhg~,.~-it is ,a mfe ptopheey. that the elaborate p~ans for. vdrg 
terma that wiU keep its population, strippea of much of their ter- 
ritory and i n d d  resources and swollen by the addition of millions 
of refugees, d 1 y  well fed, simply won't work. S t a b  and the 
Communhta have at le- as good a chance as anybody to profit 
by the economic chaos. 
The Far East was not mentioned in the Podam statement 
bat on August 8 the Soviet Union went to war with Japan. Pre&dent 
Truman expIained that at the Potsdam meeting, Stalin had promised 
to come into the war but apparently the world shaking invention 
and nss, of the atomic bomb hastened his action. His armiw marched 
one day before the Japanese first propoeed a conditional acceptance 
of tha Allied ultimatum which Stalin oeginally had not signed. 
Stalin's strategic position was such that his armies moved at once 
into Manchuria and Korea. On August 13, 1945 the New York Timer 
gave prominence to a story from the Lovulon Sundcly Observer that 
Stdin and R m v e l t  had reached a 5 point secret agreement at 
Yalta giving Stalin an overlordship of Manchuria as well ru, Mongolia. 
Whether this is true or not so strong is his geographic and strategic 
position, so completely loyal are the Chinese Communists to him 
that he will probably get what he wants on the Asiatic mainland. 
I doubt if the treaty he made with Chiang Kai Shek's government will 
stand in his way any more than former treaties with Poland. 
Stalin may ultimately win in Japan itaelf thanks to Com- 
m&t agitation and resentment at the appalling destruction we 
have wrought with the atomic and other bombs. Meanwhile south- 
ea-rn Aaia will be fertile temtory for Communist propaganda since 
as yet Measril. Truman and Attlee have-offered to the colonial peoples 
no guarantee that for them "liberation" will mean anything but a 
return to the tender mercies of their former French, Dutch and 
Britiah mlers. This sort of policy 3nvites Stalin to carry out Dallin98 
contention that he is still the servant of world revolution while 
seeking R d a ' s  power in the name of secuqity. 
It is possible that the picture may change, but so far the most 
probable explanation of events is that Russia was allowed to do 
about what s h m r  her maeter-wanted in eastern and central 
Europe in return for a support in Asia which the atomic bomb seeam 
to have made unnecessary, but where Stalin's position will enable 
him ta bpote onother R d n  peace.* That future might not m 
ro dark if I could forget the millions of slave workers in Ruda  Or 
the d e s  carried by ths same issue of the New York Times, which 
reported the mre t  deal at Yalta of the way the Red Army has w 
wild in Hungary9 Cmchoslova%ia, and Austria. Not for a minute do 
I suggest that the deoirable alternative is an Anglo-American im- 
perialism based on our temporary possession of the secret of the 
atomic bomb. It ie a different kind of world in which the peoples of 
Ada md Europe will have genuine independence within the frame 
work of regional and w-odd federation. 
Here, however, we come to the place where history ends and 
prophesy 'be*. The hietory that we have given-and scarcely any 
of our tiacts do Stab's Americans supporters even try to deny- 
juatifiee the aeartion that Stalin9% foreign policy constitutes a new 
imperialism, far cleverer for our timea, than the' old model either 
of the Oars or of the British Tories, but nonethelm imperiali8111 in 
ordinating eveqdhg  to Rust6an mcurity and power, which are 







WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
Our diecussion of conditions in the Soviet Union and of 
Stalin'~ foreign policy raises a double set of questions. The first 
*Despite American led British invitations to Stdin t attack Japan I cam 
Id' not see k t  k t  it constituted aggressive war - as certai y was the case with 
Stalin's d e r  attacks on Poland and Finland - according to the definitians 
under which Jn&e Jaekeon wuld try the G e m  war criminals. And I can 
see no axense fur ~ ' B * C O ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ M C ~  of attack aher the Japanese Emperor 
surrendered except that the more territory the dictator had in his posms~ion the 
better hb bugaitiing position. On the other hand the terms of Sulin'e treaty 
with chmb made public after this paaphlet had gone &to the printer, whae stiff 
a decidedly better tlian I had f e n d  aiid wammt hope that Stalin cm be made 
to we lb6 darn of a noa-imper*li& policy. 
IAllis Fiechet who has niade a tharoa& study of Rneiian fereip polic~r 
sap that S t a h  ir camyirig out its traditional care not to be expa~81bnlst on 
ea- and metttn frobite sirndta1hebu61y. To Stalin hb ~ m ~ p e a n  gain# are 
vital and hd t n ~ t  yet etromg enough te risk tbem by aggression fn the Fat East 
which might b*g bim into conflict with the United States, the tempbrary 
moaapolist af the atomic bbmb. We a n  rejoice in his lfladartion whatewer its 
realon d d  hope for its continuance by his government and by his Chineb Cam- 
mnaia foU0wem 
concerns th~'daina?ratic sociabt altematite'b~th to ptirate i s a m  :; 
bm ta and the way that alternative ~ a n  be.a&&. -, 
The. d ~~~ the future of pelice. In om 6fFicid; *kBfr, -:' 
*:The ~dl,-ad ihtdaribw pamphlets (for example, Denz&dy h fWt 
Doomed) ' *e + & the first pmblbm. It ' 3 ~  our emphatic c06&an 
%at & tobdita12"an state is not the ' i n e 6 t a ~ e  alterdative' tb -a d w  
3- bf prfvate dapitklim least of t& id h oounry ~ t h  Amdcish. -1 
tradhiaaip &d fndmtrid experience. I . ... ,. . Il. 
. 1 -  . 
We shaie ~ a k e  hope- that the rigok of t o t a I i t a r i ~ ' i n  
the S d e t  Union may be modified by postwar develop&enta It'& 
-edmpbtel7 imp1tabab1e that an anti-Bolshevik molat ion- f l  f o b w  
a m d d  war. It is equally impdmble, we mnst agah lh.t 
R d a  will re- to any hi& degree of private oimemhip aC the 
mema of iraduction. It is, on the other hand, p d l e  that S t h  the 
growth df indmthal skill the regime's dependence opon Oapitalist -- 
mmetavy inmntives on the one hand, and the p- of a poliee - 
state on tha stbar, to make men work, will be letmned. I . '  ; -  J 
Dallin, in The Red S&et Ruwia, ba& his La$ ,hope ror 
progress on ending the power of the NKVD and the w e t  police. 
'I%% organization, he says, is resented by all claslres: peamnts, work- 
ers, the Army, the rank and file of the Communist Party, and the 
intelligentsia up to the top Jayem ofr the bureaucracy iteelf. The 
morale of the country, which has been high under pressure of patriot- 
&& will need to continue at a high level to repair the terrible de- 
vbtationr of war. Stalin or his successor may come to believe that he 
- 
can better maintain morale wlithout the NlECVD than with it. 
\ 
- Stdin bae justified to hie people and perhaps even to b l f  - 
the .fig~m of the secret police and his d&andrs on neighboring pee . 
plea in. the liame of Rmian security. His- country's- power mow. so . 
obvio+ that ip fear ought t o  vanlsh. Stalin hae fared %very- id 
'&pfem'e witb the A.lli& and in.pIaw, s d . ~  the are&w 46~3d 
eety. ' f h d -  ta the' w*, - xdE~ns~'of :Ruesiaqa' h+v6 -l@neath:cd .that 
foiai@eri are' human and that 8 great -9 .f&eiignerb &&.:bet& 
off .- - ip . ~pattieal -gods th6n they & , ~ v e i i ; ' l t  *<+: not be 
&. o,.-.*t& . propagandize . them- i n ~ .  thintine: &at .r&ati+ely: -.t&ii 
ha* hhieved a heevexi which evil -cap's@ai-e 'i@ :ithe'; qnbide *w&lj3 ..L 4 
wjll ~V-W d~ d v  is kept ~ f ~ d e g  a.:diatat0dtip dp'.- . .  . . .  . . - 
aipprdpitate ti, hell. ' - - .. _ _  - t .  - . ' a  a . . . <:- -. . . 
3% 
' . & -  -he .  Op. - enmurages two hte~related h o w  
for~grbwth d~freedollr~h'-,gPda,.and for a leesenin@: of her lrhroit 
p a d d u @ m k ~ . d d  .for &ty. Both of these factom will make 
- 
1 . ' ; : - . *  ' . r *  - 
. . 
! It A1 a h  be a factor making for peacethat the of 
iia countxy .'will .want. an&r great war and .will realize, ' q e c i d y  
in thk ' e k '  Of the two principal ' powem, the U. S. S. . & Qnd 
U. s. 'k,','tb;t for them there is no economic neeemity or ',ed'v&tag; 
worth a war. There will be c o d &  of economic intireit bat they 
olylit not 4p.-lie'beyond iagmonable policibs of adjnstinebt. .l[i is the 
ad&* d:ikat&md~ bet-' fears, and pride, prejndicea md ltmt 
for pqmm awhidi-amake~passible the folly of war in an anarchie medley 
of nathb. 
, o;lk of the way of lies in the 
fa+ that the dictatomhip in a totalitarian state finds it enormo~ly 
aonvement if not essential to have a foreign enemy or danger to 
exploit to keep the people quiet at home.. It is this featore of total- 
itarianism which threatens peace rather than any doctrine &ir- 
reconcilable conflict in a '&odd Ghich "cannot exist halt dfssdckic' 
and haV totalitarian.'' Against thb cornpubion of dicta&&$ toGard 
war k t  he set a fait -Which as intelligent a man ar .St& mlgt 
recdgniee, &nelp .that while the Soviet Union and the United :St?%+ 
conld hurt each other terribly with the weapons of modern war 
neither. could succesefd1p invade and occupy the other's home ter 
*ries. ~ o n i e m ~ l a t i n ~  , . this, he. may well aecide that his world 
revolutiog e& be still longer postponed if it means war with h e r i c p  
or other mehods f o ~ d  to qdvanke it. Tl;e atomic b o d  first. dmpped 
after I hrd d t t e n  these pages, may strengthen thew 1p:fl&0ne at 
the clam& *&that it teach- the restof us the imperativ~ n d ~  
of a-better bae% for peace than now exiets. 
- 
- .  . . . - . .  . . 
1tGil.k~ mexi-thnt I a m  rejecting 9 gbpd many t h e o h  which 
p++& &*t&jEtfqr. I&& p;obability ot -either p e w  or . .. 9PPf 
ae i n-* . a ,ded*iiori from qertaig ammid predk. . . ... . 
. , . _ _,.- . . I . \. . . - 
. - . Wdter bippxaima and other h8vd. 8~gad for the high p d r b -  
ility. .. ot pemee bhmkn. the : worM21i- pea- powen, fimtk- 
of - Radafu &&toria fsimdship with: the .Uhited Stam 'an& .-& 
b m m  B d i  .& ad ''elephant* and *e AngI(~Ame&aa -gmtupm ~rf 
nations is a ''whale" and whales and elephmte don't fight. The 
b r i c  friendship of the two great nationa has not p&ented yeara 
of suspicion and will not of itself prevent war. W e  have already a& 
mitted that the United States and Ruseia would have difficulty in 
invading each otheh home territories, but beyond that the elephant 
versus whale theory is silly. The ink was scarcely dry on the paps 
of Lippmann's book when the Rumian ''elephant" rtuhed to gain 
aceem .to the warm watens of the Mediterranean which the British 
%hale" had long tried to deny him. 
If the Lippmann theory is too optimistic about peace some 
other theories are too pessimistic. No ideological differences between 
socidian and capitalism will israritcrbly lead to war between groups 
led by the United States and Rnseia respectively. At most they may 
make such a war easier to begin and to rationalize. There is. a c o a c t  
between socialism and capitalism which need not be fought out 
on the plane of any sort of war, and certainly not of war between 
natiom since it is a conflict which crosses national hes. On the 
simple theory of inevitable war between a Socialist Russia and the 
capitalist powers the lineup in this war would never have been what 
it was. It would have seemed to Lenin impossible. You wodd not 
today find some of the staunchest apologists for Stalin and preachere 
of the possibility of profitable trade between our two nation8 among 
American capitalist spokesmen, yet this is the case today. Stalinist 
Russia has few stauncher champions than the conservative New York . 
H e r d  Tribune and Thomas W. Lamont of the House of Morgan. i 
The truth of the matter is that while the Russian economy is wl- " 
lectivist it is a state capitalist type of collectivism, and while Ameri- 
can economy is still predominantly that of private enterprise, its . 
collectivist features grow apace. And the third of the Big Three -. 
has elected a sooialist government. 
I 
If the conflict b e e e n  m i a h  and capitalimn will not of 
itwlf b a g  Russia and America. to war, neither, (~d' I have 'already 
remarked, win the conflict between democracies and the' great total- ' 
itarian power. True demockacy is 'iet~kded and not advanced by 
war. No nation ha6 ever redly fought a war .to imp- democracy 
on a n d e r  although after other forces have broaght on a conflict 
m e  crtwdhg slogan like "making the world safe foi democracy" 
may be used'to ritionabe irnd glorify it. To be slue, the ~trnggls 
agaht  t o t r r l i t a r i ~  must go on. War is its choeen tool which 
democracy can use at enormous peril. 
This whole doctrine of "inevitability" of wars and other p a t  
social events ie dangerously overdone. Belief in a fatahtic philcmphy 
has made many people down through the centuries profess belief 
in inevitability but it has enabled none of them to prophesy exactly 
what was inevitable. The area in which men in aociety can make 
effective choices is limited. Certain great movements sweep toward 
broadly outlined results. With technological and other changes, old 
eocial sy~tems give way to new, but the new is never wholly and 
fhdly &aped withent men's choice between alternatives. We are 
not yet damned to pe&h by atomic energy. There were few wars, 
if any, w h i h  could not have been averted by wise action taken in 
time. The Niagara River sweeps over the falls, but boats on it do 
not have to go over if their mastere choose their course and destina- 
tion in time* 
All that one can say is that the present stream of paver 
polities and imperidism sweeps us toward war rather thnn peace. 
Neither a secret conference at Potsdam nor a United Nations Cos- 
ferenee at San Francisco of itself can save us. 
Mankind will not be damned by a third world war unless the 
two greatest powers are bn opposite aides. We Americans who demand 
deliverance tnw so terrible a doom must do these things: 
1. Insiet on facts for ourselves and all peoples. That's no 
easy job in America; it will be far harder to open Russia to ,their 
dhemination. But the power of American example plus quiet and 
friendly prewure, by no meane involving threat of war, may accomp- 
lish eomething in a Russia no longer isolated from close contacts 
with other lands or in mortal terror for her own security* 
2. Set our American home in order. R d a  wi l l  scarcely 
move toward democracy if in the minds of the people our American 
democracy is tied up with unemployment and Jim Crowism at home 
and imperialism abroad. 
3. - Work far harder and more intelligently to rescue Europe 
from hunger and chaos. Not only in the political reconstruction of 
$mope but in the elementary business of feeding the hungry we 
r' 
air; dekyua bad job. A hungry Europe will not be democ~blth. 
will have little trouble silencing domestic oritieh by ~ointep~to: hh 
people the f&e of nomCommdt oountries some of which looked 
t& Brit&(: and America fo; help and guidance. 
8 - . . 
: . 4. Give hope to Asia by a A-imperiaht peace. The 
most probable occasion of World War IlI w d d  b , a  &la& in Asia 
between an America which, having destroyed Japan should snppott, 
' 
yhiw impe&dim, 8~bnomic a d  - politid, over colored peopbe,. 
a& 8 So* Union which having treated m a  like Polwad dadd 
spollllor .* w e ,  of the colonid people& There is grad 
for hope in* peqp~ of the Rwo-chinem &earn anlpa-d -d@k. , 
thh p w ~ h h  War  f b t  : :s . . 
. ;a 
. , 
5. Remember ,that appeasement in its. modem '~eaee ir, hot, 
the Aid  30 peace, bat war. The choice for in ~ u r i $ e  h& ne+e?' 
lie~G'be&een fighting either Britain or Russia, and ippemhq on< . . 
or the othe=, or arranging a compmmise between them i t  'dab ex- 
pemm of the -weak. It is now too late to do all that @$at hove beem 4 
done for a free and'federatcd Europe, but withont h e a t  af w a ~  irj. m 
ac&npb aml friendly pramurea we can do much for ,bettez.p&m* 
Failing that, we at l em can refme to aademrite shameful dcrlr re: ! 
the principle that our own peace requires a kind of thieq '  harmony 
&on% the Big Thre~, eepecially with Stdin. 
, . r ,  ( 1  . . ' . . 
1 . . .  
~n op i~ points we .ought te find m&h fnpnr. 
the tri-ph of the Labor Party *in Great Britain. Not only should 
th&t,.abie~ a Setter ~Brithh policy than the Tories had, but eriorinoua 
&ikziig&&t thronghont the wodd . a d  especially in 'w&tkn 
Eniope; to the fotcea which seek a better way than CO-&&[ 
t d h f i *  or monarchist reaetion. At the same time, 18iikhh; 
fabar'deeply ddrei, friendship with the Soviet Union - not, hop< 
at the price of appeasement. The new government's lbyalty tb  th< 
colonial Empire, applauded by Churchill, ie, however, ilisqbieting. 
6. The eeatest single-- contribntion to peace b e k n  ; '& * 
U, So S. R..and the U, S. A., indeed the one ,=ntialtb the smyibd' 
of the race must be a renunciation of war to which the creation of 
a world authority for the control of atomic energy &B esenzial. En- 
dnring peace repuire~ more &an mere renunciatioil of war or:mgr 
compesitive dmamemt K t e d y  Qoma our race. All tau of recurity 
by b o d d m  and baeee ir archaic nonsenee in. a world of r&t 
When. I f@k I h t e  . ,  th chapter my sixth point called for 
steadfwt efforti bi our government to reach an agreement with 
R d a  ' (and u a.logiepl eommpmce with the whole world) for the 
a b o l i h -  E IPU& military eonscription. Smh oonecription in 
the Uaite$t htsr,  I a p e d ,  could have value, if at dl, ody in a 
war -rg.inrt ~oair--wasi& i t . w d d  make more likely. To the degree 
that the-third worl& WP would be affected by mam d e e  trained in 
pep- I dd, would have all the. benefits of a race in 
c o ~ p ~  bea- of her strategic position and her greater pope 
lation and bidmate. Nevertheless, I felt that so great was Raseia'e 
need of msn for peaceful building that Stalin might be persuaded 
by patient hn.ne88 to agree to a worldwide abolition of peacetime 
military d p t i o a ,  .a cmessnre which he himaelf had once pro- 
pomd I still think it vital to end peacetime military conscription 
if wg, MsltJy  . < *  mean to abolish war. 
. / - , a .  % 
But the one imperative problem is to w e  atomic energy far 
 pea^, &r. It has been eeriously proposed that we &are the 
m t  with Stalin, I +do not believe that peace wodd be adv@ 
b~ ejviog,~~ggrewor  a g b t  Poland and Finland the atomic b&., , . 
Yet, rr a,-ed soldier long connected with the General. St$f 
in W-og bas tald me, Russian scientists m& have the s&et 
in from twa;to &x years.. It b oar buphem in the meantime to work 
oat .C~DRO&, hx : a, world auibrity p ~ ~ ~ e e s e d  of a power which, the 
U a i H  &- Oqpdmtiw lqcka. Even a world auth0mity;backed 
by the e d  . f ~ r  eelf pamemation should be denied the 
@$at aton& for the curbing of pny p d 1 e  a p  
&r group ar nation, There are less d8n&e1:ous police weapons that 
it can u+ +a world in wbich natioru as they value their lives must 
. . * .  .1.+;;* h " '  . .. 
*gibe ap &npetztaSe a&im6ni.,.They a-t cling to war and sue 
cemfully: imbnnw 'btbmic ehergy, but in the abolition of war they 
8 1  * 
can mpLe th6 eonhol of atomic energy a -vital first step. S t a h  mwt 
me the n d t y  for auch a measure, and as a price of America's 
tbtmhg & lie tkporary monopoly in satanic dejstructicm to a 
watld d;uthOrity h e  mmaet .listen to the voice of reaeon and fair play 
such vital mattem as free commdcations between pab 
43 
ples and the end of the imperialkt policies he has ~bssn play- 
Literally I see no other hope, and that hope is dependent not only 
upon Stalin but upon an American wiedom, self-control and lovebof 
worldwide democracy bf which our government and people show all 
too few signs. Our task begins at home but it cannot end there. 
There ie no people on earth free from faults, neither the 
Raesiane, the Briti~h, nor onrselvee. But also there i~ no people on 
earth d d m w  of the calamity of new war. War is a dise88e of rival 
governments, and tho= who would cure it must Lnow the tmth 
about government& This pamphlet h a  been written to set forth 
certain-baeic facte about Rusaian dictatorship as contrasted with the 
ideals of true socialism. That men should know the truth is'mm~tial 
to bnilding for peace and freedom. 
A NOTE ON AUTHORITIES 
A 
This is written not only to cite my own sources, but to en- 
conrage your reading. 
I have relied, especially in Chapters dl and IV, on fmte given 
in Apthur Koestler's essays on Rmia in hie latest book The Yogi 
d the C o m m ~  (Maensillan) and David I. Dallin9s The Red 
Soviet R u s h  (Yde Press). Mr. Koestler was once an active Cozw 
- m d t  and is a man of the highest integrity., Mr. Dallin was a now 
Bo&evik member of the Moscow Soviet 1918-1921. Both docnment 
their statements carefully. I have a copy of one of their authortiee, 
a speech made by Lucjan B. a Polish Socialist in London at a Con- 
ference of representatives of Socialist parties on April 9, 1943, d e  
scribing hh experiences as a prisoner and in Russian wogk camp. 
Few Germirn stories are worse. I 
William L White's Report on the Russians (Hamurt) ie up 
to date and valuable within its declared scope. It might be read in 
conjunction with Richard T. Lauterbach's Thee  Are the Russians. 
(Harper'e) . , 
Different as are the books in tone, they are not sedously c q -  
tradictory in facts - in so far as Mr. Lauterbach go- in for facts 
rather than impressions. 
The violence of the attacks on Mr. White and hie publisher, 
in many caees by people who never read the book, is itself significant 
of a very bad approach- to the tmth. If Mr. White had written in the 
same vein &out BItitain, France or America no one would have 
been greatly excited. 
M ~ g m 0 2 t  in Russian Znducta-y and Agricul~re by Bien- 
stock, Schwarz and Yugow (Oxford Press) is wholly objective .and 
informative. 
John Sccitt &ves a sympathetic picture of the upbuilding of 
industry based on his own life in Magnitogorsk in Behind the UrcJs 
(Houghton Mifflin). His Duel for Ewope (Houghton) covering the 
period of the Hitler-Stalin pact is also valuable. 
I give weight to statements by Louis Fischer in Men d 
Politics (Duel) and Alexander Barinine in One W'ho S m i u d  (Put- 
nun) not only became they write from long experience but because 
Barmine wae a Soviet diplomat and Fischer had been long an ardent 
pro-Stalinist. 
Slightly older but very valuable are Freda Utley's The h m  
We Lost (John Day) and Manya Gordon's Wbrkers Before ad After 
Lenin (Dutton) 
For facts on Stalin's new imperialism one must rely on news- 
paper dispatches and magazine articles most of which today come 
from men anxious to put the best interpretation on the deeds of our 
powerfnl Ally. Propaganda material issued by the Poles and Baltic 
epokmmen contain factual statements that can't be waved aside. 
Valuable books in this field include Dallin's Soviet -Ruuids Foreip 
Policy 1939-1942, Ruada and Post-War Europe, and The Big Three 
(Yale Prem), Ann Sn Cardwell's Pokud and Rurricr (Sheed and 
Ward) and William E m  Chamberlain's The Ukraine: o Sub- 
mew Notion (Macrnillan) , America: Purttker in WOFM Rule (Van- 
guard) and some of the hateria1 in his older The Rursiclrr Enigmu 
(Smib~er). 
Older books (prior to 1939) and other 80urces Joel Seidman 
mid I carefully listed in our pamphlet Russia: Denwcracy ar Dictator- 
ship? (L.I.D.) 
A large number of books by the Dean of Canterbury, Sir 
-~e&ard Paree, Manriee Eihdna, Albert Rhp WU- P . P d  &~mLin, 2' 
&idtiua T. -~trtxte&ach,'~dmnnd Stevens, *emledell W& and &beak . 
r ~ t h  'varying degrees of enthtmism ns of R d m  p-em 'h ' - 
amm, pmgrem in industry, &6 exce11erik.af R d m  d d . W w ~  
and the pmsibili~ and neceseity of continned R&lrlmeriib@$rit~d- 
&p, Wt of what they say may be true witbout, affecting the facts , 
brth in this psmphl&t which the write.m in' @esti4@iqgely . . 
g: 
avoid. . A - .  ,. , 
i 
, . , . ~ c l u a i o n  I mwt acknowledge my debt to .&WE, ax~&oritiee i 
om. Rwph, William Henry Chamberlain, Soltmop @W-. 4 ' 
Bertriun Wolfe for reading my manuscript and maLiqg correctialU, 
ahd suggestione. I, however, am wholly reeponaible for the' f o ~  
which it appears. I a m  especially grateful ts Dorothy MCCOI& . . Ld 
Rut& * , .  'flrav"re . for typing various copies of the mmn8~ript.' . - 
. * .  * 
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